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1. Introduction
Since the late 20th century, hurricanes and the resulting floods have been the costliest of all natural disasters in the United States both in terms of lives lost and property damaged. Especially
deadly are floods caused by hurricane storm surge; it is estimated that nine of every ten deaths
from hurricanes are caused by storm surge (Perry 2000; Meyer et al., 2012; King, 2012; Kousky,
Michel-Kerjan, & Raschky, 2013; Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2015). The 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season was both hyperactive and especially destructive; 2017 saw 17 named storms and is
one of only five years on record which saw multiple Category 5 storms. (Dolce, 2017) Additionally, the 2017 season was the most costly on record due its three most powerful storms: Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Hurricane Harvey inflicted massive damage on this city of Houston,
Texas and caused widespread flooding the likes of which had not been seen since Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans 12 years to the month in 2005. Just days after Harvey dissipated,
Hurricane Irma attained Category 5 status East of the Lesser Antilles and tore through the Carribbean, eventually resulting in over 100 deaths and leveling 95% of all structures in the nation
of Barbuda. Later on in September, Hurricane Maria hit the islands of Dominica and Puerto Rico
causing widespread damage to critical infrastructure and hundreds of deaths. Preliminary estimates
for the cost of the 2017 season generally center around the $200 billion dollar mark. (Drye, 2017;
Sullivan 2017) Taking a longer perspective, the thirty most costly hurricanes making landfall in
the United States from 1900-2010 inflicted close to $400 billion in damages (Blake, Landsea, &
Gibney, 2011; Blake et al. 2013; Burris 2015).1 Going forward, the effects of climate change are
expected to increase both the frequency and severity of extreme weather events such as hurricanes
(IPCC, 2007; Botzen, Aerts, van den Bergh 2009; Landry and Jahan-Parvar, 2011; Kousky, 2011;
Michel-Kerjan, Lemoyne de Forges, & Kunreuther, 2012). Increased precipitation may result from
a more erratic climate, and rising sea levels will bring storm surge further inland, increasing the
probability and negative consequences of major flooding incidents in some coastal areas. Exacerbating this problem are significant increases in population and housing investment in coastal areas
of the United States. During the period from 1960-2008, the population of coastal counties saw an
80% increase from 47 million people in 1960 to 87 million people in 2008. During the same period, the respective number of housing units in coastal areas more than doubled from 16.1 million
to 36.3 million (Wilson and Fischetti, 2010).2 An increasing number of structures coupled with
more densely populated coastlines will result in both greater spatial correlation among damages
1 Damage

estimates adjusted for inflation using the United States Census Bureau Price Deflator for Construction
counties are defined by NOAA as those with “at least 15% of the county’s total land area located within
the Nation’s coastal watershed” or “a portion of the entire county accounts for at least 15% of a coastal cataloging
unit.” It is important to note that under this definition most coastal counties are not actually adjacent to the ocean.
2 Coastal
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and greater loss of life in the event of a catastrophic hurricane. Further, the escalating trend in
population and capital investment in coastal areas calls into question the long term insurability of
hurricane risk. Kousky (2011) specifically notes that the increased exposure to coastal wind peril
has decreased the availability of reinsurance, putting greater strain on state-run wind insurance
pools.
Hurricanes and the resulting floods have extraordinarily high socio-economic costs, and there
is a clear need for protective and adaptive measures to deal with the risks they pose. Estimates for
the total value of property in coastal areas of the United States vary. Kunreuther (1996) pegged
the total insured value of coastal property at $4.26 trillion in 1993 (up from an estimated $2.51
trillion in 1988). Insurance firm AIR Worldwide estimated the total value of insured property in
coastal states at $7.2 trillion in 2004 and updated their estimate to $10.6 trillion in 2012 (AIR
Worldwide, 2005, 2013). Nordhaus (2006) estimates “the total value of capital in areas close to
sea level” at a more conservative $1.46 trillion.3 What is clear from these estimates is that the risk
of hurricane damage in coastal areas and the level of people and capital investments exposed are
increasing. Insurance is a natural tool for pooling and distributing risk, but it has been difficult to
apply in the case of hurricanes and floods. In the past, private insurance markets were not willing
to provide adequate levels of coverage for flood and wind peril, and thus governments stepped in
to provide insurance coverage to those households at risk. Even with government intervention in
the insurance markets, however, purchase rates for flood insurance remain low.
Building on recent research into household risk management decisions (Petrolia, Landry, and
Coble 2013; Petrolia et al. 2015), this paper uses household-level, cross-sectional survey data combined with experimentally derived risk preference information to examine the decision to invest in
flood and wind insurance contemporaneously with the decision to mitigate hurricane risk, focusing on households living in the Gulf Coast region of the United States. We probe the question of
what factors hold significant influence over an individual’s decisions to engage in these protective
measures to safeguard property from hurricane risk and how the decisions are interrelated.
This paper contributes to the literature on decision-making under risk and uncertainty by examining integrated individual choices of insurance products and mitigation, examining the influence
of observable factors on choice, and controlling for unobservable effects that can correlate across
decisions. We specify a tractable modeling structure that permits correlated insurance and mitigation decisions, taking account of the nature of the available data.
3 Kunreuther

(1996) estimates converted to 2005 dollars, Nordhaus (2006) estimates in 2005 dollars
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2. Background
2.1. Flood Insurance in the United States
The private market for flood insurance in the US never fully developed. Major issues which have
caused many private insurers to withdraw from the market include: certainty of loss in flood prone
areas, adverse selection, moral hazard stemming from government disaster aid (known as the “charity hazard”), and high premiums resulting in low uptake rates (Anderson, 1974; Petrolia, Landry,
& Coble, 2013). Additionally, the “catastrophic” nature of flood risk has always been a major
stumbling block for the market. Kousky (2011) defines a catastrophic risk as having two main
characteristics. First, the probability of occurrence declines slowly relative to the magnitude of
the event, meaning that the strongest recorded magnitude event may be many times larger than the
second strongest. Second, losses resulting from catastrophic risks are correlated in space. Spatial
correlation of losses presents an especially difficult hurdle for private insurers because losses are
not statistically independent. This leads to an intertemporal smoothing problem in which insurance companies incur massive losses some years and zero losses in others (Michel-Kerjan, 2010;
Kousky 2011). Because of these factors, most private insurers had exited the flood insurance market by the 1950s. Following a series of large hurricanes ending in 1965 with Hurricane Betsy,
Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act in 1968, creating the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP). The NFIP was designed to be a voluntary partnership between flood-prone communities, the federal government, and private insurance firms (Atreya, Ferriera, Michel-Kerjan,
2014). Though the program has been amended several times since the passage of the initial law,
the overall structure and responsibilities of the respective stakeholders remains largely the same.

2.2. Wind Insurance in the United States
Traditionally, coverage for wind peril was available through homeowners insurance but individuals
living in areas highly prone to hurricanes may find a limited number of insurers that offer such
coverage. The lack of supply in the voluntary market for wind coverage has put pressure on the
government to make coverage available in residiual markets for these high risk areas (Petrolia,
Hwang, Landry, & Coble, 2015). Separate “wind-only” insurance in the United States can come in
several forms: Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) Plans1 , reinsurance funds, state wind
1 Established under the Housing & Development Act of 1968, FAIR plans are designed to provide insurance in
both rural and urban areas to individuals who cannot obtain coverage in the private market. Currently 32 states and
Washington, D.C. have FAIR plans available (Hartwig & Wilkinson, 2014; Kousky, 2011).

Published by Digital Commons @ Center for the Blue Economy, 2021

3

Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3

pools, or hybrid programs that provide both homeowners’ insurance and hazard-specific policies
(Kousky, 2011). Currently, only Florida operates a state-run reinsurance program (the Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund), but state wind pools or hybrid programs exist in North and South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Hawai’i. Similar to the
National Flood Insurance Program, most state funded wind insurance programs were created in
response to a single extreme weather event that forced private insurers to exit the market or raise
premiums, which led to public outcry for a political response. Policymakers generally designed
these programs to be lenders of last resort, but they have since evolved from this original role to
become major property insurers in their respective states and sometimes the only option for highrisk properties. The structure and pricing strategy of wind insurance programs vary by state; for a
detailed analysis of individual state programs see Kousky (2011).
Since 1990, the residual market for wind insurance has experienced substantial growth both in
terms of the number of policies in force and the total loss exposure. The number of policies in
force in the residual market (including both FAIR and state wind pools/hybrids) saw a three fold
increase during the period from 1990 to 2014 but has stayed fairly level since 2006. Total exposure
of the residual market increased eleven fold over the same period but has declined by one-third
since 2011.2

2.3. Moral Hazard, Catastrophe Insurance,
and Mitigation
A key problem facing both the NFIP and state wind insurance programs is the potential for moral
hazard. Moral hazards arise in insurance markets because of a fundamental conflict of incentives
between the buyer and seller: as the quality and quantity of insurance against some loss increases,
the buyer’s incentives to avoid the hazard decreases (Stiglitz, 1983). This conflict of incentives results in the buyer of insurance not bearing the full cost of their actions and may result in increased
risk-taking because the agent feels protected from the hazard. In the market for catastrophe insurance, moral hazard can influence location choice and may lower incentives for mitigation if
insurance rates are not adjusted to reflect the true risk of the hazard faced. A particular variety of
moral hazard that is relevant in the context of catastrophe insurance is “charity hazard” (Browne
& Hoyt, 2000). The charity hazard hypothesis argues that if individuals believe the provision of
government-funded disaster assistance is likely in the wake of a loss event, they will be less apt to
engage in protective behavior such as insurance purchases or mitigation activities, and thus they
shift the costs of their risky behavior onto the taxpayer.
2 Policies

in force increased from 0.931 million in 1990 to 3.215 million in 2013; Exposure to loss increased from
$54.7 billion in 1990 to a high of $884.7 billion in 2011 and declined to $639.4 billion in 2014 (Hartwig & Wilkinson,
2014).

https://cbe.miis.edu/joce/vol8/iss1/3
DOI: 10.15351/2373-8456.1128

4

Laird et al.: Riders on the Storm

Policymakers have attempted to address moral hazard problems through legal mandate, incentives to mitigate, limits on coverage, and use of deductibles. Laws such as the Coastal Barrier
Resources Act (Pub.L. 97-348) and the Stafford Disaster Relief Act (Pub.L. 100-707) explicitly
prohibit certain post-disaster reconstruction and provision of federal disaster assistance/flood insurance in prescribed areas, while permitting the federal buyouts of high-risk properties that are damaged or destroyed (DHS, 2002; Kriesel & Landry, 2004; Pompe & Rinehart, 2008). Other forms of
legal mandates include local building codes designed to improve the resiliency of newly built structures. Incentives to mitigate in the NFIP are primarily available at the community/municipality
level through the Community Rating System (CRS), which rewards communities with reduced
premiums for voluntary mitigation activities or efforts to increase participation in the program.
State run wind insurance programs focus their mitigation incentives at the household level and
vary by state. For example, mitigation credits for wind-hardened structures are available in North
and South Carolina, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, and Hawaii, while Georgia and Texas require
homes to meet hurricane building codes as a prerequisite for coverage. Despite these efforts, many
of these programs do not price their coverage to risk and significant moral hazard problems likely
remain.

3. Data
The household data in our sample were collected in August and September of 2010 from an online
survey administered by Knowledge Networks. The survey consisted of 41 questions designed to
measure insurance and mitigation behavior, as well as elicit individual risk preferences and environmental risk perceptions; if took an average of twenty minutes to complete. Participants were
paid $5 for completing the survey and were also eligible to earn an additional $10 (on average)
by completing the Holt-Laury (2002) risk preferences exercise at the end of the survey. The target population for the survey was property owners in coastal counties along the US Gulf Coast
including Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, plus the Atlantic coast of Florida.
In total 96 counties were sampled for our analysis. Knowledge Networks sampled a total of 1,536
individuals from their KnowledgePanel® , and of those sampled, 1,070 responded (69.6%) and 859
allowed access to their street address.1 Of the 859 responses with street addresses, only 670 were
usable after dropping observations with unreliable street addresses/flood zones or missing values
for variables included in the model. A map of the sample respondents is given in Figure 1.2 Since
1 Street

addresses were used to calculate geographic variables including distance to the nearest shoreline and flood
zone through the use of GIS methods. This further allowed us to expand the data set to include the year in which the
home was constructed and the CRS score for each respondent’s community using county tax assessor data and the
FEMA DFIRM database.
2 Source: BLINDED FOR REVIEW
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we have a random sample of households in coastal counties, we have greater information on more
populated areas. Over half of our observations are from Florida (67.8% ) and roughly a quarter are
from Texas (24.8%). The remaining observations are divided between Louisiana (3.1%), Alabama
(3.0%), and Mississippi (1.3%)

Figure 1: Map of Survey Respondents

The survey required residents to indicate whether they held flood and/or wind insurance policies as well as the number and type of mitigation measures installed on their home. Table I breaks
down the flood policy responses by state and by location in the 100-year flood plain. Overall only
233 individuals (34.8%) in our sample holds a flood insurance policy and of those policyholders,
93 (13.9%) are inside a SFHA. Looking at the breakdown by state, Florida had the greatest number
of policies overall (129, 19.3% of total policies) and also the greatest number of policies in SFHAs
(66, 9.9% of total policies). Texas had the greatest number of policies in Non-SFHA areas (68,
10.1% of total policies) and also had the highest in-state uptake rates for SFHAs (85.0%) excluding
Mississippi which had only two observations in a SFHA. Texas also had the highest in-state uptake
rate in Non-SFHA areas (46.6%). Louisiana had the highest overall in-state uptake rate at 52.4%
but had significantly fewer observations than Texas which had an overall uptake rate of 51.2%.
Table I: Flood Policies by State and SFHA Status
SFHA

Non-SFHA

Total

AL
FL
LA
MS
TX

# obs
0
110
12
2
20

# w/ Policy
0
66
8
2
17

row %
0.0
60.0
66.7
100.0
85.0

# obs
20
344
9
7
146

# w/ Policy
4
63
3
2
68

row %
20.0
18.3
33.3
28.6
46.6

# obs
20
454
21
9
166

# w/ Policy
4
129
11
4
85

row %
20.0
28.4
52.4
44.4
51.2

Total

144

93

64.6

526

140

26.6

670

233

34.8

Figure 2 indicates the classifications used to determine the type of wind peril coverage a homeowner had and to measure the level of mitigation undertaken by the homeowner. Table II displays
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the results for wind insurance. Most homeowners in our sample had some form of wind coverage
(602, 90.0%) either through their homeowners policy (470, 70.2%) or under a separate wind-only
policy (132, 19.7%). Florida had far and away the greatest number of total wind polices (419,
62.5%) while Alabama and Louisiana had the highest rates of in-state uptake at 95%.

Figure 2: Survey Questions Used to Determine Wind Insurance Type and Mitigation Measures Undertaken

Table II: Wind Peril Coverage Type by State
State (% in State, Column)
LA
MS

AL

FL

Wind Included in Homeowners
Wind Excluded from Homeowners
Separate Wind Policy

17 (85%)
1 (5%)
2 (10%)

327 (72.03%)
35 (7.71%)
92 (20.26%)

15 (71.43%)
1 (4.76%)
5 (23.81%)

Total

20

454

21

TX

Total

6 (66.67%)
3 (33.33%)
0 (0%)

105 (63.25%)
28 (16.87%)
33 (19.88%)

470 (70.15%)
68 (10.15%)
132 (19.7%)

9

166

670

Table III breaks down the mitigation count by state. All responses marked “don’t know” were
recorded as “no” responses. Write-in answers were added to mitigation counts were appropriate. Examples of acceptable write-in responses included metal roofs, hip roofs, polypropylene
screening, reinforced garage doors, concrete blocks, and boarded windows.The mean number of
mitigation measures for our entire sample was 1.8 while over one-third of respondents reported not
engaging in any mitigation measures whatsoever (207, 30.9%). Florida had the greatest number
of total mitigation measures (454) followed by Texas (166). The state with the highest percentage
of observations engaging in at least one mitigation measure was Mississippi (77.8%) followed by
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Florida (75.8%) while Texas had the lowest (49.4%). Overall, 69.1% of our sample engaged in at
least one mitigation measure.
Table III: Mitigation Count by State
State (% in State, Column)
LA
MS

AL

FL

TX

Total

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

5 (25%)
6 (30%)
4 (20%)
3 (15%)
1 (5%)
1 (5%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

110 (24.23%)
83 (18.28%)
89 (19.6%)
68 (14.98%)
59 (13%)
33 (7.27%)
9 (1.98%)
3 (0.66%)

6 (28.57%)
7 (33.33%)
3 (14.29%)
1 (4.76%)
3 (14.29%)
1 (4.76%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

2 (22.22%)
3 (33.33%)
1 (11.11%)
1 (11.11%)
1 (11.11%)
1 (11.11%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

84 (50.6%)
37 (22.29%)
19 (11.45%)
16 (9.64%)
6 (3.61%)
1 (0.6%)
1 (0.6%)
2 (1.2%)

207 (30.9%)
136 (20.3%)
116 (17.31%)
89 (13.28%)
70 (10.45%)
37 (5.52%)
10 (1.49%)
5 (0.75%)

Total
Mean

20
1.6

454
2.1

21
1.6

9
1.9

166
1.0

670
1.8

Individuals carrying wind coverage included in their homeowner’s policy or in a separate windonly policy had higher mean levels of mitigation than those who carried no wind coverage. In
contrast to the traditional economic theory of insurance, this could suggest that individuals in our
sample do not view hazard mitigation as a substitute for insurance or that the pricing structure
is sufficient to address moral hazard problems (Erlich & Becker, 1972; Mossin, 1968). It may
also reflect a degree of salience of natural hazard risk that influences some individuals to purchase
insurance, while also being aware of the level of mitigation present on their home. There could
be errors in the mitigation count, which require attention in econometric modeling, in addition to
correlations for unobserved factors across equations.
Finally, respondents were asked: “For storm resistant features that your home does not have,
what is the main reason you have not installed them?” The two most common responses indicated
40% of individuals “do not think my home needs any additional storm resistant features” and 30%
of individuals believe “the upfront installation costs are too high.”
Figure 3 shows excerpts from the survey instrument used to measure individual risk preferences
and risk perceptions. Measurement of risk preference was based on the experimental design of Holt
and Laury (2002). Participants were presented with ten real-money gambles: five framed as a loss
and five as a gain to test for asymmetry across the wealth domain consistent with Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Payoff probabilities were set at (0.1/0.9), (0.3/0.7), (0.5/0.5),
(0.7/0.3), and dollar amounts were fixed. Respondents were given $10 prior to completing the
exercise to prevent negative payoffs and were told one of their choices would be selected from
each domain at random to determine their realized payoff. The total number of choices in which
the participant selected low-variance risk over high-variance risk were tallied and used as our measure of risk aversion. The means over the gain and loss domains were 2.93 and 2.94, respectively,
indicating our sample was slightly risk averse on average over both domains. This measure of risk-
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Figure 3: Experimental Questions Used to Determine Risk Preferences, Survey Questions to Measure Risk
Perceptions

(a) Expectation on the # of ≥Cat 3 Hurricanes over next
50 years

(b) Expectation of damage under ≥Cat 3 Hurricane

Figure 4: Risk Perceptions I

aversion is not without pitfalls, however. In the survey exercise we use low-stakes and relatively
high probabilities to elicit risk preferences. This is potentially problematic because insurance decisions concerning catastrophic risks such as hurricanes deal with high-stakes and low-probability
(Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Petrolia, Hwang, Landry, & Coble, 2015).
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In addition to risk preferences, the survey inquired about the respondent’s perception of hurricane risk and recovery. We elicited the expected number of category 3 (or stronger) hurricanes that
would pass within 75 miles of each respondent’s community over the next 50 years, the expected
level of damage that would be incurred in the event of a category 3 storm, the perceived likelihood
that insurers would pay the full amount of a storm damage claim, and the perceived likelihood
that the respondent’s property would be eligible for government disaster assistance after a storm.3
Histograms for the responses to these questions are detailed in Figures 4 and 5. For expected
hurricanes, the majority of the respondents (524, 78%) indicated their expectation was from 0-10
Category 3 storms, implying a maximum of 0.2 storms per year. Yet, considerable proportions of
respondents fall into the “11 - 20” and “21 - 30” response categories, 12% and 5% respectively. A
very small number of respondents indicated expectations of more than 30 hurricanes of Category
3 or greater in the next 50 years; these subjects may have not understood the question, or they
may harbor extremely pessimistic expectations of climate change. The mean of expected structural damage was around 33% of structure value, with the bulk of perceptions in the range of 10%
to 50%. Perceptions of insurer credibility and the likelihood of disaster assistance were each centered around moderate response (category 3 on a 5-point Likert scale), with confidence in insurers
payout skewed towards full confidence and likelihood of disaster assistance skewed towards very
unlikely.
Ancillary data were collected on relevant variables such as aggregated county-level federal
mitigation grants paid out through FEMA under the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA), Repetitive Flood Claims (RFC), and Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) programs. Other pertinent variables
include housing type, mortgage status, experience with past instances of wind/flood damage (to
account for potential ‘availability bias’ consistent with the work of Tversky & Kahneman, 1973),
and demographic variables such as income, race, gender, education, marital status, number of children, etc. Variable descriptions and summary statistics for all variables included in our model are
given below in tables IV and V.

3 Perceived

likelihood of government assistance was used to test the charity hazard hypothesis (Brown & Hoyt,
2000; Petrolia, Hwang, Landry, & Coble, 2015)
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Table IV: Summary Statistics
N = 670
Std. Dev.
0.477
0.398
1.694

Min
0
0
0

Max
1
1
7

Sum
233
538
1195

Exp. Sign

Flood Policy
Wind policy
Mitigation Count

Mean
0.348
0.803
1.784

Risk Aver., Gain
Risk Aver., Loss
Policy Reqd.
Past Damage
Eligibility
Credibility
Exp. Damage
Exp. Hurr
Dist. Shore
CRS
Florida x CRS
Mortgage
SFHA
Mort x SFHA
X-Zone
Pre-FIRM
Property Age
Mobile Home
Condo
Gulf Years
Oth. Property
Education
White
Male
Income
Employed
Kids
Flordia
Texas
AL or MS
Louisiana
Wind Excluded
Internet Access

2.928
2.940
0.166
0.469
0.584
0.681
3.327
6.791
15.580
6.951
4.563
0.672
0.215
0.146
0.601
0.404
28.760
0.0328
0.115
27.263
0.060
4.000
0.816
0.467
12.299
0.554
0.264
0.678
0.248
0.0433
0.031
0.299
0.957

1.446
1.367
0.372
0.787
0.493
0.467
2.195
10.655
18.101
1.472
3.258
0.470
0.411
0.354
0.490
0.491
20.910
0.178
0.319
18.010
0.237
1.599
0.387
0.499
3.895
0.497
0.441
0.468
0.432
0.204
0.174
0.458
0.204

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
5
1
4
1
1
10
90
171.682
10
10
1
1
1
1
1
210
1
1
93
1
7
1
1
19
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1962
1970
111
314
391
456
2229
4550
10438
4657
3057
450
144
98
403
271
19269
22
77
18266
40
2680
547
313
8240
371
177
454
166
29
21
200
641

+
+
+
+
+/+/+/+/. . .
+
-/-/+
+
+
+
?
?
-/. . . /. . .
?
?
?
+
?
?
+
+
+
?
?
?
. . . /. . . /+
. . . /. . . /. . .

Where two or three signs given:
flood eq sign / wind eq sign / mitigation eq sign, “. . . ” = not included
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(a) Perceived likelihood of a full insurance payout
covering all storm damages (1 = no confidence, 5 = full
confidence)

(b) Perceived likelihood of state/federal post-disaster
assistance (1 = very unlikely, 5 = very likely)

Figure 5: Risk Perceptions II
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Table V: Variable Descriptions
Variable

Type

Description

Dependent Vars

Variable

Type

Description

Property Attributes Cont.

Flood Policy

Binary

Wind Policy

Binary

Mitigation Count

Count

Dependent Variable; =1 if purchased flood insurance policy, =0 otherwise
Dependent Variable; =1 if purchased separate wind policy,
=0 otherwise
Dependent Variable; number of mitigation measures installed, range is from 0 - 7

Risk Preferences
Risk Aversion (Gains)

Continuous

Risk Aversion (Losses)

Continuous

Number of instances where low-variance risk chosen over
gain domain, ranges from 0 (risk loving) to 5 (risk averse)
Number of instances where low-variance risk chosen over
loss domain, ranges from 0 (risk loving) to 5 (risk averse)

SFHA

Binary

Mortgage X SHFA

Binary

X-Zone

Binary

Pre-FIRM Structure

Binary

Property Age
Mobile Home
Condo

Continuous
Binary
Binary

Years Living on the Gulf

Continuous

Owns Other Property

=1 if home is in A or V flood zone (100 yr floodplain), =0
otherwise
=1 if home is mortgaged and in the A or V flood zone
(100yr floodplain), =0 otherwise
=1 if home outside the 500-yr floodplain, =0 otherwise
=1 if home built prior to flood insurance rate maps, =0
otherwise
Age of property in years
=1 if mobile home, =0 otherwise
=1 if housing type is condominium or apartment, =0 otherwise
Number of years living on the Gulf Coast

Binary

=1 if owns other non-coastal property worth ≥ $100k, =0
otherwise

Ordered Cat

Risk Perceptions
Demographics
Flood Policy Required

Binary

Wind Peril Excluded

Binary

Past Damage Experience

Count

Disaster Assist. Eligibility

Binary

Insurer Credibility

Binary

Expectation of Damage

Ordered Cat

Expectation of Fut. Storms

Ordered Cat

=1 if told they were required to purchase flood insurance
when getting mortgage, =0 otherwise
=1 if wind coverage excluded from homeowner’s policy,
=0 otherwise
Number of instances of wind and flood damage experienced
in the past
=1 if perceived likelihood of eligibility for postdisaster payments rated ≥3 on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very
likely), =0 otherwise
= 1 if perceived confidence that insurer will pay full amount
of claims in event of major storm is ≥ 3 on scale from 1 (no
conf.) to 5 (full conf.), = 0 otherwise
Expected proportion of damage to home given Cat 3 storm,
ranges from 0 (no damage) to 10 (total loss)
Expected number of future Cat 3 or greater storms over next
50 years

White

Binary

=1 if no HS degree, =2 if HS grad, =3 if some college no
deg, =4 if associate deg, =5 if bachelors deg, =6 if masters
deg, =7 if professional or doctoral deg
=1 if white, =0 otherwise

Male

Binary

=1 if male, =0 otherwise

Education

Income

Ordered Cat

category ranges from “less than 5, 000”to\175,000 or
more”

Employment Status

Binary

=1 if employed, =0 otherwise

Kids

Binary

=1 if have children, =0 otherwise

Florida Resident
Texas Resident

Binary
Binary

=1 if florida resident, =0 otherwise
=1 if Texas Resident, =0 otherwise

Ala. or Miss.Resident
Louisiana Resident

Binary
Binary

=1 if Alabama OR Mississippi Resident, =0 otherwise
=1 if Louisiana Resident, =0 otherwise

State of Residence

Property Attributes
Distance from Shoreline
Community Rating System

Continuous
Ordered Cat

Florida X CRS
Mortgage

Ordered Cat
Binary

Distance in kilometers from nearest shoreline
Community Rating System score; ranges from 1 (most mitigation) to 10 (no mitigation)
=CRS score if resident of Florida, =0 otherwise
=1 if home is mortgaged, =0 otherwise
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4. Conceptual Framework
To construct a joint model for insurance and mitigation decisions, we draw on previous literature on flood insurance demand, hazard mitigation under catastrophic risks, and the small number
of studies addressing demand for wind insurance. Generalizing the models for flood insurance,
wind insurance, and mitigation presented in Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) and Petrolia et al.
(2015) to fit our simultaneous approach, we assume individual agents maximize their subjective
expectation of utility where the utility for individual i is
Ui = U(Hi , Xi , Fi ,Wi , Mi )

(4.1)

where Hi is consumption of housing, Xi is consumption of a numeraire, Fi represents the decision to
purchase (Fi = 1/0) flood insurance, Wi represents the decision to purchase (Wi = 1/0) wind insurance, and Mi represents the number of mitigation measures undertaken on structure i where Mi is
an element of the set of all real, non-negative integers (Mi ∈ Z+ ). We assume that households make
insurance and mitigation choices that they perceive as optimal, resulting in Marshallian demand
functions for insurance and mitigation. Fi , Wi , and Mi can further be decomposed as follows


Fi = {0, 1} = F Pi , Li (Mi ), ωi , γi , δi , π f (ri , Mi ), πm (ri ), yi


Wi = {0, 1} = W Pi , Li (Mi ), ωi , γi , δi , πw (ri , Mi ), πm (ri ), yi


Mi = M Pi , Li (Mi ), ωi , γi , δi , πm (ri ), yi

(4.2)

where Pi is the perceived likelihood of a major storm event; Li (Mi ) is the perceived conditional
expected loss from wind/flood damage resulting from a storm, depending on the level of mitigation; ωi is the perceived likelihood of an insurance payoff (insurer credibility); γi is the perceived
likelihood of government disaster assistance; δi represents past experience with flood and wind
damage; π f (ri , Mi ) and πw (ri , Mi ) are the prices of flood/wind insurance, depending on observable
measures of risk (ri ) and the level of mitigation (Mi ) for property i; πm (ri ) is the cost of mitigation
measures; and yi represents household wealth.
The decision to purchase insurance and the decision to mitigate risk are determined by many
of the same observed and unobserved perceptual, risk, and economic factors and are jointly determined by the price of insurance and the cost of mitigation. Generally, the demand model for
a market good should include the own price of the good as well as prices of substitutes. In our
model, however, the prices of both insurance and mitigation are unobserved. In the NFIP, the price
of flood insurance is set at the national level and is based on a defined set of objective measures
for flood risk. Premiums vary by flood zone, size and type of structure, date of structure construc-
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tion, distance above “base flood elevation,”1 , and community level mitigation measures. The price
of wind insurance is determined by private actuaries (but regulated by the states) in the case of
homeowners’ insurance, or set at the state level in the case of wind pools, but in both cases will
be based on a limited set of objective measures of risk and the level of mitigation undertaken by
the property owner (Petrolia, Landry, and Coble, 2013; Petrolia et al., 2015). Because of this, our
empirical model does not include proxy variables for the price of insurance or cost of mitigation;
rather, we include the set of variables upon which the price of insurance is based. We interpret the
estimated effects of these variables as the gross impact on both price and behavior.
We hypothesize that the level of mitigation indirectly affects the decisions to purchase flood
and/or wind insurance in two ways, first, by affecting the individual homeowner’s expectation of
a loss resulting from a major storm event, Li (Mi ), and second, by affecting the prices of flood insurance, π f (ri , Mi ), and wind insurance, πw (ri , Mi ). Intuitively, it makes sense that a homeowner
who mitigates the risk his/her property faces with respect to wind and flood peril will feel better
about the chances of incurring a large loss and thus the expectation of loss from a major storm
event may fall. Additionally, homeowners are often rewarded with premium discounts for engaging in risk-mitigation activities (Kousky, 2011). For example, the Florida Windstorm Underwriters
Association (FWUA) began offering discounts in July of 2000 ranging from 3% to 18% for different mitigation activities (Simmons, Kruse, & Smith, 2002). It is reasonable to assume that
∂ π f /∂ Mi ≤ 0, ∂ πw /∂ Mi ≤ 0, and ∂ Li (Mi )/∂ Mi ≤ 0.
The closely related nature of the insurance and mitigation decisions presents a risk of endogeneity problems in our joint analysis. To grapple with this, we employ the same strategy used
by Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013). Decision variables for insurance and mitigation count are
excluded from each other’s equations and the decisions are treated as seemingly unrelated to one
another. This framework does not assume the decision to purchase insurance or mitigate directly
affects the other; rather, it assumes they are determined by the same set of observed and unobserved
factors.

4.1. Risk Preferences
In the traditional expected utility formulation for decision making under risk, insurance demand
is driven by risk aversion. A risk-averse expected utility maximizer is defined as having a utility
function that increases at a decreasing rate with respect to wealth (∂ 2Ui /∂ y2i < 0). This implies
that utility derived from risky outcomes are valued differently depending upon the level of wealth
and assets exposed. Individuals that exhibit greater risk aversion have a larger risk premium and
are more likely to insure or mitigate risks, all else equal (Smith, 1968; Mossin, 1968; Dionne and
1 Estimated

elevation of a 100-year flood as determined by FEMA on Flood Insurance Rate Maps. A detailed
description of the different flood zones is available at www.FEMA.gov/flood-zones.
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Eeckhoudt, 1985; Briys and Schlesinger, 1990).
Empirically, risk preferences have been shown to have significant explanatory power across
a range of situations. Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) found that as the real money payoffs for
gambles were increased by a factor of 10, individuals exhibited increasing levels of risk aversion.
In their experimental study of first-price auctions, Smith and Walker (1993) found that the vast
majority of subjects bid in excess of the risk-neutral predictions, indicating increasing risk aversion
as the payoffs increased. Similarly, Holt and Laury (2002) reported that as the real money payoffs
increased by factors of 20, 50, and 90, risk aversion increased sharply. In the coastal insurance
context, Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) found that individuals with a higher degree of risk
aversion, as measured by the method put forward in Holt and Laury (2002), were significantly
more likely to hold a flood insurance policy. Using insurance deductibles as a proxy for risk
aversion, Carson, McCollough, and Pooser (2013) found that risk aversion increased the likelihood
of engaging in mitigation . We hypothesize that in our joint model, as an individual’s level of risk
aversion increases, the extent of mitigation and the probability of insurance purchases will increase
(all else being equal).

4.2. Risk Perceptions
In addition to risk preferences, it is important to examine how individual perceptions of risk affect
the decision to insure or mitigate. Expected utility theory predicts that the choice to insure is a
function of both the perceived likelihood and magnitude of a loss (Rees and Wambach, 2008). The
standard model for insurance choice presumes that perceived probabilities are based on objective,
actuarial measures of risk (Smith, 1968; Mossin, 1968), though in practice this may not be the
case. Kriesel and Landry (2004) use the mean return interval for hurricane landfall as a proxy for
the expectation of hurricane risk. They find that the likelihood of holding a flood insurance policy
is decreasing in the hurricane return interval (less likelihood of a hurricane). Empirical work in the
coastal context by Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) and Petrolia et al. (2015) found that the probability of holding a flood or wind insurance policy was increasing in the conditional expected loss
resulting from a Category 3 storm event. Determining the effect of conditional expected loss on
the number of mitigation measures is problematic because, as the number of mitigation measures
installed increases, we would expect that the perceived magnitude of a loss would decrease. Without an appropriate instrument, Petrolia et al. (2015) were unable to identify this effect, and thus it
was excluded from the mitigation equation. Additionally, Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) and
Petrolia et al. (2015) found no significant effect from the expected frequency of Category 3 storm
events on the probability of holding a flood/wind insurance policy or the number mitigation measures installed. Nonetheless, we maintain the hypotheses that the probability of holding insurance
will increase with perceived conditional expected loss and the expected frequency of hurricanes.
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Past experience with storm events has also been shown to have a significant effect on the
decision to insure. Baumann and Sims (1978) found that flood insurance uptake was significantly
greater for those individuals who had some experience with past instances of flood events. Browne
and Hoyt (2000) show a positive and significant relationship between the total amount of flood
insurance damage claims paid in the previous year and demand for flood insurance. Petrolia,
Landry, and Coble (2013) and Petrolia et al. (2015) used survey data which allowed them to obtain
the number of flood and wind damage events experienced by an individual in the past. They found
that the number of past flood events had a significant, positive effect on the probability of holding
a flood insurance policy and the number of mitigation measures installed. The result for wind
insurance was also positive but not statistically significant. Peacock (2003) utilized more general
measures for hurricane experience and hurricane damage and found that, while past damage was
insignificant, past experience had a positive and significant effect on the decision to mitigate. We
employ an experience measure similar to Peacock (2003) and expect that, as the experience with
past damage events increases, the probability of holding insurance and mitigating increases.
Past experience with storm events is closely related to two other important explanatory factors
in our model: perceived insurer credibility and perceived eligibility for government disaster assistance. Dixon, MacDonald, and Zissimopoulos (2007) interviewed policyholders, insurers, and
other stakeholders in the commercial wind insurance market and found that in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, highly publicized litigation and the resulting uncertainty over the language in
insurance contracts likely had a significant effect on the commercial and residential wind insurance
market. Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) obtained results showing a positive and significant relationship between holding a flood policy and perceived insurer credibility. We hypothesize that
increased confidence in insurers will have a positive effect on the probability of holding insurance, but could have a negative effect on mitigation if risk-reducing measures are not appropriately
credited in insurance costs.
The charity hazard hypothesis posits that individuals who perceive a high probability of government funded disaster assistance in the wake of a storm are less likely to engage in protective
measures (Browne & Hoyt, 2000). Thus, those individuals who believe they are likely to receive
disaster assistance will be less likely to purchase flood/wind insurance or mitigate. While the charity hazard hypothesis makes intuitive sense, empirical findings on the subject have yielded mixed
results. Botzen and van den Bergh (2012) find evidence in support of the charity hazard hypothesis
while the findings of Browne and Hoyt (2000) and Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) refute it.
Thus we have no expectation for the sign of the relationship between perceived disaster assistance
eligibility and insurance and mitigation.
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5. Econometric Model
Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013) analyze the same survey data, but only focus on flood insurance.
Petrolia et al. (2015) do as well, but they model the decision to purchase wind insurance coverage
(over-and-above homeowners’ insurance) simultaneously with the decision to mitigate wind risk
in a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework. Petrolia et al. (2015) specify the decision
to purchase wind coverage as a probit model and the number of mitigation measures undertaken
as a Tobit model bounded between zero and maximum number of mitigation measures observed in
the data set (seven). The SUR framework permits contemporaneous correlation of the error terms
in each equation, allowing for common unobservable elements that affect each decision. Tobit
regression can be used to model count data in situations where the counts are sufficiently high
(Fair, 1978; Romer and Snyder, 1994; Campa, 1993), but this specification is less than optimal for
discrete, non-negative integer data. Petrolia et al. (2015) elected for the Tobit model in order to
simplify the correlation structure and estimation procedure. We implement a three-equation SUR
specification, which models the decisions to purchase flood and wind insurance as a bivariate,
random-effects probit model and the number of mitigation measures as a Poisson process with a
log-normally distributed mean. This approach allows for contemporaneous correlation between
the bivariate probit error terms and the log-normally distributed error of the Poisson mean, λ .

5.1. The Poisson Log-Normal Distribution
The standard model for count data is the Poisson regression model, shown in equation 5.1, where
the mean parameter of the Poisson distribution is given by λ = exp(x0 β ) to ensure that λ > 0
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). Estimation of Poisson regression assumes equi-dispersion, where the
mean and variance of the distribution are equal (λ = E[M] = Var[M]) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013).
Pr(M = m) =

λ m e−λ
m!

∀ m ∈ Z+ where λ = exp(x0 β )

(5.1)

In practice, the relationship between explanatory variables and the mean parameter is rarely parametrically exact and count data are often over-dispersed (Var[M] > λ ). The most common way
to test and account for the presence of over-dispersion is to model the conditional variance as a
function of the mean (λ ) and a scale parameter (α). This generalization of the Poisson model
results in the Negative Binomial regression. 1 While the negative binomial model is the most com1 We ran several Negative Binomial specifications, conducting likelihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis H : α =
0
0, λ = E[M] = Var[M] against the alternative H1 : α > 0,Var[M] > λ . We rejected the null in all cases and conclude
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monly used method of dealing with over-dispersed counts, it is not the only approach. This class
of models is generally referred to as “Poisson mixture models” and provides varied approaches for
dealing with unobserved heterogeneity resulting in over-dispersion (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013).
A natural choice for our context is the Poisson Log-Normal mixture. As defined by Atichison
and Ho (1989), the univariate Poisson Log-Normal probability mass function is derived from the
Poisson probability mass function in which the mean parameter (λ ) is assumed to be log-normally
distributed.
2

e−λ λ m e−0.5(log λ −µ) /σ 2
√
dλ
Pr(M = m) =
R+ λ m!
σ 2π

∀ m = 0, 1, 2, ...

where

ln(λ ) ∼ N(µ, σ 2 )

Z

(5.2)

Evaluating the integral in equation in 5.2 is difficult because of the restriction that λ > 0. To
remedy this, we introduce the change of variable ln(λ ) = µ + σ ε where ε ∼ N(0, 1), with the
corresponding Jacobian of transformation, λ σ , resulting in the probability mass function shown in
equation 5.3.
Pr(M = m) =

Z ∞ −λ m −0.5ε 2
e λ e
−∞

m!

√
dε
2π

where λ = exp(µ + σ ε)

(5.3)

5.2. The Joint Distribution of a Binary Response Variable and a Log-Normal
Count Variable
We formulate insurance-purchase decisions on a latent variable specification:

1 if x β + v > 0; f ∗ > 0
1 1
f=
0 if x1 β1 + v ≤ 0; f ∗ ≤ 0

(5.4)

when f is the likelihood of holding flood insurance, and x1 is vector of characteristics believed to
influence insurance choice (equations 4.2). Modeling equation (5.4) using the probit link function,
the probability that f = 1 conditional on some normally distributed random variable z is:
"
#
(x1 β1 + ρ(z − µz )) /σz
p
where z ∼ N(µz , σz )
(5.5)
Pr(F = 1|z) = Φ
1 − ρ2
that our counts are indeed over-dispersed.
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where Φ(.) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and ρ is the correlation
parameter.
Generally, the conditional probability in equation 5.5 cannot be used to represent count data
because it is based on Gaussian distribution theory, but when count data are over-dispersed and
can be reasonably represented by the Poisson Log-Normal distribution, the resulting conditional
probability is:
#
"
(x1 β1 + ρ(ln(λ ) − µ))/σ
p
where ln(λ ) ∼ N(µ, σ 2 )
(5.6)
Pr(F = 1| log λ ) = Φ
1 − ρ2
To obtain the joint distribution of a binary response variable and a count variable we simply multiply the marginal and conditional distributions together and the resulting distribution takes the
form:
#
"
2
Z ∞
(x1 β1 + ρε)/σ e−λ λ m e−0.5ε
p
√
dε
Pr(F = 1, M = m) =
Φ
m!
−∞
2π
1 − ρ2
(5.7)
where λ = exp(µ + σ ε).

5.3. The Bivariate Random-Effects Probit Model
We define a second binary response variable, w to construct the bivariate random-effects probit
model for flood and wind insurance in equation 5.8.
2

e−0.5η
dη
Pr(F = 1,W = 1) =
Φ(x1 β1 + θ η)Φ(x2 β2 + θ η) √
−∞
2π
where η ∼ N(0, 1)
Z ∞

(5.8)

The Gaussian error η is distributed standard normal, and θ permits correlation among flood and
wind purchase decisions. For the case in which θ = 0, the bivariate random-effects probit model
maps directly to the ordinary bivariate probit model. When θ > 0 , equation (5.8) is equivalent to
the bivariate random effects probit model, but computationally simpler to estimate, only requiring
numerical integration across the domain of η. To obtain the population averaged parameter estimates (βPop ) from the random-effects model we convert the individual estimates from the random
effects model (βRE ) using the formula:
βRE
βPop = √
1+θ2
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where the correlation between the two probit errors is given by
ρ f ,w =

θ2
1+θ2

(5.10)

5.4. The Joint Distribution of Two Binary Response Variables and a LogNormal Count Variable
We then combine the results obtained from the joint distribution of a binary response variable and
a Poisson log-normal count variable with the bivariate random-effects probit model, resulting in
the joint distribution in equation 5.11.
 


2
2
ZZ ∞
x1 β1 + θ η + ρ1 ε   x2 β2 + θ η + ρ2 ε  e−λ λ m e−0.5(η +ε )

q
q
dη dε
Φ
Φ
m!
2π
−∞
(5.11)
1 − ρ2
1 − ρ2
1

2

where λ = exp(µ + σ ε), µ = x3 β3 , η ∼ N(0, 1)
In order to estimate the parameters of the joint model, we employ Gaussian integration based on
Legendre polynomials using 322 abscissas (Abramowitz & Stegun, 1972, Table 25.4).

6. Results
Results from the joint model in equation 5.11 are given in table VI. Average marginal effects
are given for each parameter in the column right of the parameter estimate. Consistent with the
results of Petrolia et al. (2015), estimates for the joint correlation structure of the model support
the hypothesis that the decisions to purchase flood or wind insurance and the decision to mitigate
hurricane risk are interrelated. We find a significant, positive correlation between the error terms
of the flood insurance and mitigation equations (ρ f ,m = 0.2173) as well as the wind insurance and
mitigation equations (ρw,m = 0.6556). While these correlations confirm that a simultaneous, rather
than independent, estimation framework is superior, the estimated population averaged correlation
between the disturbance terms of the two insurance models was positive but insignificant (ρ f ,w =
0.1327). This indicates no gain in efficiency by allowing correlation between the flood policy and
wind policy errors and that the model shown in equation 5.7 may yield more straightforward results
when applied to the two bivariate responses individually. This result will be further addressed in
the discussion and conclusion sections.
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Table VI: Mixed-Process Regression Results
Parameter
Risk Aver., Gain
Risk Aver., Loss
Policy Reqd.
Past Damage
Eligibility
Credibility
Exp. Damage
Sqrt(Exp. Hurr)
Km
CRS
Florida x CRS

FloodPolicy

AME

WindPolicy

AME

Migitation

AME

Mitigation Elasticitiy

0.0139
(0.0445)
0.0803
(0.0496)
1.8579***
(0.2398)
0.1441*
(0.0858)
0.2795**
(0.1375)
0.1666
(0.1409)
0.0613*
(0.0318)
0.0996**
(0.0486)
-0.0083**
(0.0038)
-0.1005*
(0.0569)
0.1327
(0.0962)

0.0032

-0.043
(0.0430)
-0.0441
(0.0441)

0.0022

-0.0005
(0.0242)
-0.0277
(0.0248)

-0.0009

-0.0014

-0.0502

-0.0814

0.1366*** 0.2479
(0.0491)
0.032
0.0580
(0.0761)
0.1628** 0.2955
(0.0829)

0.0640

0.0337
0.0611
(0.0246)
-0.0053** -0.0097
(0.0023)

0.0730

0.0185
0.4289
0.0333

-0.0928**
(0.0928)
0.0645
-0.1418
(0.1418)
0.0385 -0.1477***
(0.1477)
0.0141
-0.0287
(0.0287)
0.0230
-0.045
(0.0450)
-0.0019
-0.0033
(0.0033)
-0.0232

Mort x SFHA
X-Zone
Mobile Home

-0.3808
(0.2954)
0.9108***
(0.3063)
-0.3871**
(0.1767)
-1.2367**
(0.5936)

Education
White
Income

0.0601***
(0.0196)

Employed
Kids
Florida
Texas
Louisiana

-0.249*
(0.1452)
-1.5437*
(0.7997)
0.3682
(0.3406)
-0.5701
(0.5246)

0.1074

-0.0059
-0.0009

-1.3345*
(0.7554)

-0.0830

-0.0033
(0.0033)
-0.1959***
(0.1959)

-0.0012

-0.1604**
(0.1604)
0.0139 -0.0186***
(0.0186)
-0.136
(0.1360)
-0.0575 -0.1526***
(0.1526)
-0.3563
-0.4259
(0.4259)
0.0850
-0.4412
(0.4412)
-0.1316 -0.5196*
(0.5196)

0.0885

-0.0879
0.2102
-0.0894
-0.2855

-0.1145

-0.0083*** -0.0151
(0.0026)
-0.4566*** -0.8286
(0.1314)

-0.2390
-0.0525

-0.0011
0.0217

0.0151

0.0147
(0.0101)

0.0267

0.1810

-0.2591***
(0.0884)
0.3004*
(0.1683)
-0.399**
(0.1945)
-0.165
(0.2750)
0.2262**
(0.1007)
0.3021
(0.2858)

-0.4702

-0.0685

0.5452

0.2036

-0.7241

-0.0989

-0.2994

-0.0052

0.4104

0.0675

-0.0395
-0.1202
-0.1480
-0.1159
-0.2244

Wind Excluded
Intercept

0.0187
0.1108

-0.0048

0.0946

Condo
-0.0049
(0.0037)
0.0938**
(0.0427)

-0.0144

-0.1463***
(0.1463)

Property Age

Gulf Years

0.0412

0.0306

Mortgage
SFHA

0.0011

-0.5999
(0.5999)

Variance, Correlation Structure
σ2
θ

0.245***
(0.0494)
0.3911**
(0.1825)

ρ f ,w
ρ f ,m
ρw,m

Log-Likelihood

-1720.6

0.1327
(0.1074)
0.2173*
(0.1153)
0.6556***
(0.1169)

Robust standard errors in parenthesis * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

First we address the results from our measures of risk aversion, risk perception, and household
wealth which are included in all three equations. In contrast with previous findings (Kachelmeier
& Shehata, 1992; Holt & Laury, 2002; Petrolia, Landry & Coble, 2013; Petrolia et al., 2015) risk
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aversion over the loss domain was found to have no significant effect on the decision to purchase
insurance or install risk mitigation measures. The estimated coefficients for risk aversion over both
gains and losses were positive with respect to flood and wind insurance, negative with respect to
mitigation, and similar in magnitude to those estimated previously by Petrolia, Landry, & Coble
(2013) and Petrolia et al. (2015). Turning to risk perceptions, we find that respondents harboring
a higher expectation of damage in the event of a Category 3 storm were significantly more likely
to hold a flood insurance policy. A one unit increase in expectation of damage increases the probability of holding flood insurance by only 1.4%. This result did not hold for wind insurance.1 The
expected frequency of future storms was found to have a significant effect on the probability of
holding flood insurance, but not wind insurance or mitigation. A one-unit increase in the number
of expected storms over the next 50-years increases the likelihood of holding flood insurance by
2.3%. We find that the number of experiences with past wind/flood damage events has a significant, positive effect on the probability of holding flood or wind insurance as well as the number of
mitigation measures installed, a result echoing those found by Botzen, Aerts, and van den Bergh
(2009), Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013), and Petrolia et al. (2015). Each additional damage
event increases the probability of holding flood and wind insurance by 3% and 25% respectively,
and results in an additional 0.04 mitigation measures installed.
Insurer credibility was found to have a significant and positive effect on the probability of holding a wind insurance policy and the number of mitigation measures installed, but had no significant
effect on holding a flood insurance policy. A one unit increase in credibility increased the probability of holding wind insurance by 10.7% and results in an additional 0.3 mitigation measures
installed. We find no evidence in support of the charity hazard hypothesis in our data. While
perceived eligibility for government disaster assistance was not statistically significant in the wind
and mitigation equations, those who perceived a high likelihood of disaster assistance were significantly more likely to hold a flood insurance policy. A one unit increase in perceived eligibility
increased the probability of holding a flood policy by 6.5% on average. Consistent with the previously published findings (Baumann & Sims, 1978; Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Kunreuther, 2006;
Landry & Jahan-Parvar, 2011) we find positive income effects across all three equations, with
marginal effects of 1.4% for flood insurance, 1.5% for wind insurance, and 2.7% for mitigation.
The following sections address the remaining covariates equation-by-equation.

6.1. Flood Insurance Model
Results from the flood model show that individuals who were required to hold flood insurance
(presumably those individuals with federally insured mortgages inside SFHAs) were significantly
1 Expectation

of damage was excluded from the mitigation equation to avoid potential endogeneity problems: an
individual who mitigates may have a lessened expectation of damage or vice versa
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more likely to actually hold flood insurance, increasing the probability of an insurance purchase
by almost 43%. Further, the interaction term for those households with active mortgages inside
of SFHAs was statistically significant and positive. Those individuals with active mortgages in a
SFHA were 21% more likely to purchase insurance. These effects, also found by Petrolia, Landry,
and Coble (2013) and Petrolia et al. (2015), were robust at the 1% level of statistical significance
and had exhibited some of the strongest effects on the probability of holding flood insurance. These
results provide evidence in support of the effectiveness of mandatory purchase requirements for the
100-year flood plain. SFHA status alone, however, did not significantly affect the probability of
holding flood insurance.
As expected, households farther away from the nearest shoreline were found to be less likely to
hold flood insurance, consistent with Kriesel and Landry (2004), Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011),
and Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013). In line with this result, households located in areas outside the 500-year flood plain (estimated probability of flood annually < .02%) were significantly
less likely to purchase flood insurance. Florida residency significantly reduced the probability of
holding flood insurance by a significant margin of almost 36%. This surprising result, given that
Florida has the highest number of total flood policies, may be partially explained by flood mitigation efforts at the municipal and state levels as measured by the CRS. The CRS coefficient was
negative and statistically significant as expected, indicating that uptake of flood insurance is greater
in NFIP communities that are engaged in mitigation efforts. However, when CRS is interacted with
the Florida residence dummy, the result becomes insignificant and the sign is reversed. This result,
also obtained by Petrolia, Landry, and Coble (2013), may indicate that homeowners in Florida
view community level mitigation projects as a substitute for traditional flood insurance.
Structure type also appears to play a significant role in the decision to insure against flooding.
Those individuals who resided in mobile homes were significantly less likely to hold flood insurance than those in houses or condominiums. Demographic variables for education level and the
presence of children in the home were also found to have significant effects, each positive. The
number of years a respondent had lived on the Gulf Coast had no significant effect.

6.2. Wind Insurance Model
Here we evaluate the results from the parameters unique to the wind insurance equation. The
presence of a mortgage contract was found to increase the probability of holding wind coverage
despite the fact that no mandatory purchase requirements exist for wind peril (Petrolia et al. 2015).
An active mortgage contract increased the probability of holding wind insurance by almost 10%.
Those respondents living in condominiums were less likely to hold wind insurance policies than
those in houses or mobile homes. Regarding demographics, white households were significantly
more likely to hold a wind policy than non-whites (by 9%), and those households with children in
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the home were significantly less likely to have wind insurance (by 12%). Wind insurance uptake
in Louisiana was found to be significantly less than other states in our data. On average, Louisiana
residency decreased the probability of purchase by 22%. The distance to the nearest shoreline, age
of the property, and employment status all had insignificant effects.

6.3. Mitigation Model
Finally, we look to the results from the mitigation model. Distance to the nearest shoreline was
found to have a negative and significant effect on the number of mitigation measures installed.
This effect is, however, extremely small, with an average marginal effect is only -0.01 mitigation
measures for each additional kilometer from shore. Structural characteristics play a role in the
mitigation decision. We find that households in condominiums and those living in older structures
install significantly fewer mitigation measures. Additionally, we find that residents of Florida install significantly more mitigation measures, while residents of Texas install significantly fewer.
Contrary to the findings of Carson, McCullogh, and Pooser (2013), we find a significant and negative effect of the presence of children in the home.
The coefficient on our indicator for location inside an area where wind peril is specifically
excluded from homeowners policies is also statistically significant and positive, meaning that after
controlling for other relevant explanatory factors, those individuals who have no wind coverage in
their homeowners policy install more mitigation measures than those who are covered. This finding
runs counter to Petrolia et al. (2015) but is in line with the findings of Carson, McCullogh, and
Pooser (2013) who found that individuals located in the “Wind Borne Debris Region (WBDR)”2
where wind coverage was unavailable, were generally more likely to engage in mitigation and
spent more money on mitigation activities.

7. Discussion
Modeling household choice in a contemporaneous regressions framework, we find statistical evidence of correlated errors among hazard insurance and mitigation decisions. To model simultaneous insurance and mitigation decisions jointly, we introduce a random effect in a bivariate probit
model and allow for this effect to be correlated with a log-normally distributed error term from a
hazard mitigation count data model. We find the decisions to purchase flood insurance and wind
insurance are each positively correlated with the extent of hazard mitigation, while the correla2 FEMA

defines the WBDR as Portions of hurricane-prone regions that are within 1 mile of the coastal mean highwater line where the basic wind speed is 110 mph (49 m/s) or greater; or portions of the hurricane-prone region where
the basic wind speed is equal to or greater than 120 mph (54 m/s); or Hawaii.” (FEMA, 2009)

Published by Digital Commons @ Center for the Blue Economy, 2021

25

Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 3

tion among flood and wind insurance holdings is not statistically significant. Our econometric
approach is a parsimonious and tractable way to permit correlation among insurance and mitigation decisions. Marginal effects are relatively simple functions of the estimated model and their
standard errors are calculated by the delta method. Our approach has general applicability to any
analysis that wishes to link binary choice models to one or more count data models?as long as the
counts are over-dispersed (which is a fairly common feature of count data).
Our expectations were that this framework would create efficiency gains that would provide
substantial insight into factors that influence hazard insurance and mitigation decisions. While
we do find evidence of reasonably good fit (in terms of likelihood ratio tests and information
criteria), support for the effects of structural parameters, like risk preferences and risk perceptions, is mixed. In a break from previous results, we found no significant relationship between an
individual’s experimentally-derived risk preference measures and their decision to insure or mitigate. Since our model could be viewed as a more complete and flexible formulation of insurance
and mitigation decisions (compared to previous work with the same dataset–Petrolia, Landry, and
Coble (2013) and Petrolia, et al. (2015)), this result calls into question the external validity of
experimentally-derived risk preference measures in application to actual insurance and mitigation
decisions. Our findings, however, could be related to the magnitude of stakes, the context of the
experiment, subject confusion regarding the experiment instructions, or some other artifact of the
survey instrument and experiment.
We do find evidence that individual perceptions of risk have an influence on insurance decisions, but only for flood insurance. The magnitude of the effects seem reasonable; a one unit
increase in the expected number of large coastal storms (Cat 3 or greater) in the next 50 years
increases the likelihood of holding flood insurance by 2.3%, and a one percent increase in expected structural damage increases flood insurance likelihood by 1.4%. Risk perception measures,
however, have no detectible effect on wind insurance holdings or hazard mitigation. Our survey instrument measures offer an intuitive way to approximate risk perceptions, but there is a clear need
for additional research on potential instruments and internal and external validity. A more simplistic measure of risk perception based on experience (the number of past occurrences associated with
disaster damage) had a much more robust influence on insurance and mitigation choices (increasing the probabilities of flood and wind insurance by 3.3% and 4.1%, respectively, and mitigation
count by 0.6 measures).
Also relevant to the discussion of risk perceptions are beliefs about the credibility of insurance
providers in honoring valid damage claims and the likelihood of disaster assistance. Each of these
aspects were measured using a Likert-scale, but converted to a binary indicator for purposes of
regression analysis. The credibility of insurance providers has no influence on flood insurance
holdings (perhaps due to the backing of the Federal government), but has positive effects on wind
insurance (increasing likelihood by 10%) and hazard mitigation (an additional 0.11 measures).
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While the positive effect on wind insurance is expected, the effect on mitigation is less intuitive.
This result, too, could be related to overall salience of risk, suggesting that general measures
of hazard awareness (vis-a-vis other day-to-day concerns) may be useful frames to qualify more
detailed measures of risk perception and beliefs about the aftermath of large-scale disasters.
Consistent with previous analyses of these data, we find an unexpected positive relationship
between beliefs about the likelihood of being eligible for disaster assistance and flood insurance
holdings (with no effect on wind insurance or mitigation measures). This result may reflect salience
of flood risk and awareness of disaster assistance programs, rather than expectations of receiving
assistance. Additional research into the charity hazard hypothesis, especially as related to hurricane risk, is warranted. Qualitative analysis of individual experiences, attitudes, perceptions,
and beliefs about government disaster assistance could provide useful insight into the potential for
charity hazard and would likely aid in designing reliable quantitative measures of expectations of
assistance.
The effect of a mortgage contract had consistently large effects on insurance holdings. Those
located in a SFHA with a mortgage contract were 21% more likely to have flood insurance (the
largest marginal effect of all covariates), and the likelihood of having wind insurance coverage
was 9.5% greater for those with a mortgage (the second largest effect in the wind equation). These
results suggest that legal requirements and the leverage of lending institutions could be some of the
most important determinants of insurance coverage. Consistent with previous literature, household
income had a positive effect in the insurance equations (Baumann and Sims, 1978; Browne & Hoyt,
2000; Kunreuther, 2006; Landry & Jahan-Parvar, 2011; Petrolia, Landry, and Coble, 2013; Petrolia
et al., 2015), but no effect on mitigation, whereas those living in a mobile home were less likely to
have flood insurance, and those living in a condo were less likely to have wind coverage.
Those households for which wind insurance is excluded on their homeowners’ policy undertook about 0.4 more mitigation measures, on average. This effect is among the largest determinants of the extent of mitigation (along with residence in a condominium and presence of kids in
the household, each of which was negative). Analysis of mitigation, however, could be improved
upon. In our survey, respondents were asked only to indicate if the mitigation measures were installed on their home and were not asked if they themselves elected to install the measures. Thus,
it is entirely possible that some mitigation measures were already installed on the home when the
survey respondent purchased it or the respondent included both pre-existing and onwer-installed
mitigation measures. While we model this choice as a decision by the homeowner, a conservative
interpretation of the results seems prudent. Also important to note is the lack of alternative forms
of flood mitigation in the survey. While elevation of the home is the most effective method of
mitigation, other mitigation activities such as dry flood-proofing (sealing structures, waterproof
membranes), wet flood-proofing (elevation of key household appliances electrical panels, water
heaters, HVAC, washers/dryers, etc.), and levees/floodwalls were not included in the mitigation
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count (Eckroth, 1999). Future research should explore other ways to measure and model disaster
mitigation, perhaps using indexes.

8. Conclusions
This paper presents results from a household-level analysis of decisions to insure against or mitigate hurricane risk along the United States Gulf Coast and Florida Atlantic Coast. Our analysis
represents the only study to consider wind insurance, flood insurance, and mitigation activities
contemporaneously, while including information on risk preferences, risk perceptions, objective
measures of hurricane risk, and demographics. We find evidence that risk perceptions and other
household factors have some influence on storm risk management, but the strongest effects tend
to be related to mandatory insurance requirements associated with location in high-hazard areas.
This suggests that behavioral factors, such as optimism bias, ambiguity, or under-weighting of low
probability events may be at play. Experience with storm-related damages has a consistent positive
effect on all forms of risk management we analyze, but previous research has shown that the role
of experience in risk assessment can decay over time (e.g. via the availability heuristic (Bin and
Landry 2013; Atreya, Ferreria, and Kriesel 2013)). Experimentally-derived measures of risk preference over both the loss and gain domains were not statistically significant explanatory factors in
our analysis, and expectations of eligibility for disaster assistance had an unexpected positive sign
on risk management decisions (indicating no support for the charity hazard hypothesis).
Future research should seek to build upon these findings by exploring other ways to measure
risk preferences (perhaps using larger stakes, introducing additional real-world context, or amending elicitation instruments to improve individual understanding). Our measures of risk perception
include expected storm frequency and proportion of home damage due to a storm. While intuitive,
future research could seek to formulate and test different measures. Similarly, expectations of disaster assistance and the possibility of charity hazard deserves more exploration. Innovative survey
designs based on insights derived from qualitative research with coastal households should provide
a solid foundation for future research.
In addition, future research should seek to explicitly incorporate insurance prices, subsidy levels, and other incentives for hazard mitigation that may exist at the state or local level. Flood
insurance rates are based on flood zone, housing structure attributes, and community factors (e.g.
CRS scores); detailed data are required to estimate flood insurance rates, and since rates are based
on risk factors and set at the federal level, econometric identification of price effects can be challenging (though time-series data with differences in rates may be helpful). Wind insurance rates
vary by state, but are based on diverse calculations that many insurance providers consider proprietary. Survey-based methods can potentially be used to measure wind insurance costs, with
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imputation and bootstrapping employed to estimate the likely price of those that do not hold wind
insurance and regression standard errors, respectively. The costs of mitigation vary greatly, but
prices of some measures may be approximated, though this would necessitate a more disaggregated approach.
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